immediate application."5 This foreshadowing of postmodernist epistemology is by no means coincidental. The profound connections between complementarity and deconstruction have recently been elucidated by Froula (1985) and Honner (1994) , and, in great depth, by Plotnitsky (1994) .6,7
A third aspect of quantum physics is discontinuity, or rupture: as Bohr (1928; cited in Jammer 1974, 90) explained, [the] essence [of the quantum theory] may be expressed in the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories and symbolized by Planck's quantum of action." A half century later, the expression "quantum leap" has so entered our everyday vocabulary that we are likely to use it without any consciousness of its origins in physical theory.
Finally, Bell's theorem8 and its recent generalizations9 show that an act of observation here and now can affect not only the object being observed-as Heisenberg told us-but also an object arbitrarily far away (say, on Andromeda galaxy). This phenomenon-which Einstein termed "spooky"-imposes a radical reevaluation of the traditional mechanistic concepts of space, object, and causality,10 and suggests an alternative worldview in which the universe is characterized by interconnectedness and (w)holism: what physicist David Bohm (1980) has called "implicate order."" New Age interpretations of these insights from quantum physics have often gone overboard in unwarranted speculation, but the general soundness of the argument is undeniable.12 In Bohr's words, "Planck's discovery of the elementary quantum of action . . . revealed a feature of wholeness inherent in atomic physics, going far beyond the ancient idea of the limited divisibility of matter" (Bohr 1963, 2; emphasis in original).
Hermeneutics of Classical General Relativity
In the Newtonian mechanistic worldview, space and time are distinct and absolute.13 In Einstein's special theory of relativity (1905), the distinction between space and time dissolves: there is only a new unity, four-dimensional space-time, and the observer's perception of "space" and "time" depends on her state of motion.14 In Hermann Minkowski's famous words (1908): "Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality" (translated in Lorentz et al. 1952, 75) . Nevertheless, the underlying geometry of Minkowskian space-time remains absolute. 15 It is in Einstein's general theory of relativity (1915) that the radical conceptual break occurs: the space-time geometry becomes contingent and dynamical, encoding in itself the gravitational field. Mathematically, Einstein breaks with the tradition dating back to Euclid (which is inflicted on high-school students even today!), and employs instead the nonEuclidean geometry developed by Riemann. Einstein's equations are highly nonlinear, which is why traditionally trained mathematicians find them so difficult to solve.16 Newton's gravitational theory corresponds to the crude (and conceptually misleading) truncation of Einstein's equations in which the nonlinearity is simply ignored. Einstein's general relativity therefore subsumes all the putative successes of Newton's theory, while going beyond Newton to predict radically new phenomena that arise directly from the nonlinearity: the bending of starlight by the sun, the precession of the perihelion of Mercury, and the gravitational collapse of stars into black holes.
General relativity is so weird that some of its consequences-deduced by impeccable mathematics, and increasingly confirmed by astrophysical observation-read like science fiction. Black holes are by now well-known, and wormholes are beginning to make the charts. Perhaps less familiar is Godel's construction of an Einstein space-time admitting closed timelike curves: that is, a universe in which it is possible to travel into one's own past!17 Thus, general relativity forces upon us radically new and counterintuitive notions of space, time, and causality;18 so it is not surprising that it has had a profound impact not only on the natural sciences but also on philosophy, literary criticism, and the human sciences. For example, in a celebrated symposium three decades ago on Les Langages critiques et les sciences de l'homme, Jean Hyppolite raised an incisive question about Jacques Derrida's theory of structure and sign in scientific discourse: When I take, for example, the structure of certain algebraic constructions [ensembles] , where is the center? Is the center the knowledge of general rules which, after a fashion, allow us to understand the interplay of the elements? Or is the center certain elements which enjoy a particular privilege within the ensemble? . . . With Einstein, for example, we see the end of a kind of privilege of empiric evidence. And in that connection we see a constant appear, a constant which is a combination of space-time, which does not belong to any of the experimenters who live the experience, but which, in a way, dominates the whole construct; and this notion of the constant-is this the center?19
In mathematical terms, Derrida's observation relates to the invariance of the Einstein field equation G, = SrGT,v under nonlinear space-time diffeomorphisms (self-mappings of the space-time manifold that are infinitely differentiable but not necessarily analytic). The key point is that this invariance group "acts transitively": this means that any space-time point, if it exists at all, can be transformed into any other. In this way the infinitedimensional invariance group erodes the distinction between observer and observed; the rr of Euclid and the G of Newton, formerly thought to be constant and universal, are now perceived in their ineluctable historicity; and the putative observer becomes fatally de-centered, disconnected from any epistemic link to a space-time point that can no longer be defined by geometry alone.
Quantum Gravity: String, Weave, or Morphogenetic Field? However, this interpretation, while adequate within classical general relativity, becomes incomplete within the emerging postmodern view of quantum gravity. When even the gravitational field-geometry incarnate-becomes a noncommuting (and hence nonlinear) operator, how can the classical interpretation of G,L as a geometric entity be sustained? Now not only the observer, but the very concept of geometry, becomes relational and contextual.
The synthesis of quantum theory and general relativity is thus the central unsolved problem of theoretical physics;21 no one today can predict with confidence what will be the language and ontology, much less the content, of this synthesis, when and if it comes. It is, nevertheless, useful to examine historically the metaphors and imagery that theoretical physicists have employed in their attempts to understand quantum gravity.
The earliest attempts, dating back to the early 1960s, to visualize geometry on the Planck scale (about 10-33 centimeters) portrayed it as "space-time foam": bubbles of space-time curvature, sharing a complex and ever-changing topology of interconnections (Wheeler 1964) . But physicists were unable to carry this approach further, perhaps because of the inadequate development at that time of topology and manifold theory (see below).
In the 1970s physicists tried an even more conventional approach: simplify the Einstein equations by pretending that they are almost linear, and then apply the standard methods of quantum field theory to the thus oversimplified equations. But this method, too, failed: it turned out that Einstein's general relativity is, in technical language, "perturbatively nonrenormalizable" (Isham 1991 , sec. 3.1.4). This means that the strong nonlinearities of Einstein's general relativity are intrinsic to the theory; any attempt to pretend that the nonlinearities are weak is simply selfcontradictory. (This is not surprising: the almost-linear approach destroys the most characteristic features of general relativity, such as black holes.)
In the 1980s a very different approach, known as string theory, became popular: here the fundamental constituents of matter are not pointlike particles but rather tiny (Planck-scale) closed and open strings (Green et al. 1987) . In this theory, the space-time manifold does not exist as an objective physical reality; rather, space-time is a derived concept, an approximation valid only on large length scales (where "large" means "much larger than 10-33 centimeters"!). For a while many enthusiasts of string theory thought they were closing in on a Theory of Everythingmodesty is not one of their virtues-and some still think so. But the mathematical difficulties in string theory are formidable, and it is far from clear that they will be resolved any time soon.
More recently, a small group of physicists has returned to the full nonlinearities of Einstein's general relativity, and-using a new mathematical symbolism invented by Abhay Ashtekar-they have attempted to visualize the structure of the corresponding quantum theory (Ashtekar et al. 1992; Smolin 1992 ). The picture they obtain is intriguing: as in string theory, the space-time manifold is only an approximation valid at large distances, not an objective reality; at small (Planck-scale) distances, the geometry of space-time is a weave-a complex interconnection of threads.
Finally, an exciting proposal has been taking shape over the past few years in the hands of an interdisciplinary collaboration of mathematicians, astrophysicists, and biologists: this is the theory of the morphogenetic field.22 Since the mid-1980s evidence has been accumulating that this field, first conceptualized by developmental biologists (Waddington 1965; Corner 1966; Gierer et al. 1978) , is in fact closely linked to the quantum gravitational field:23 (a) it pervades all space; (b) it interacts with all matter and energy, irrespective of whether or not that matter/energy is magnetically charged; and, most significantly, (c) it is what is known mathematically as a "symmetric second-rank tensor." All three properties are characteristic of gravity; and it was proved some years ago that the only self-consistent nonlinear theory of a symmetric second-rank tensor field is, at least at low energies, precisely Einstein's general relativity (Boulware and Deser 1975). Thus, if the evidence for (a), (b), and (c) holds up, we can infer that the morphogenetic field is the quantum counterpart of Einstein's gravitational field. Until recently this theory has been ignored or even scorned by the high-energy-physics establishment, which has traditionally resented the encroachment of biologists (not to mention humanists) on its "turf."24 However, some theoretical physicists have recently begun to give this theory a second look, and there are good prospects for progress in the near future.25
It is still too soon to say whether string theory, the space-time weave, or morphogenetic fields will be confirmed in the laboratory: the experiments are not easy to perform. But it is intriguing that all three theories have similar conceptual characteristics: strong nonlinearity, subjective space-time, inexorable flux, and a stress on the topology of interconnectedness.
Differential Topology and Homology
Unbeknownst to most outsiders, theoretical physics underwent a significant transformation-albeit not yet a true Kuhnian paradigm shift-in the 1970s and 1980s: the traditional tools of mathematical physics (real and complex analysis), which deal with the space-time manifold only locally, were supplemented by topological approaches (more precisely, methods from differential topology26) that account for the global (holistic) structure of the universe. This trend was seen in the analysis of anomalies in gauge theories (Alvarez-Gaume 1985);27 in the theory of vortex-mediated phase transitions (Kosterlitz and Thouless 1973);28 and in string and superstring theories (Green et al. 1987 ). Numerous books and review articles on "topology for physicists" were published during these years (e.g., Nash and Sen 1983).
At about the same time, in the social and psychological sciences Jacques Lacan pointed out the key role played by differential topology:
This diagram [the M6bius strip] can be considered the basis of a sort of essential inscription at the origin, in the knot which constitutes the subject. This goes much further than you may think at first, because you can search for the sort of surface able to receive such inscriptions. You can perhaps see that the sphere, that old symbol for totality, is unsuitable. A torus, a Klein bottle, a cross-cut surface, are able to receive such a cut. And this diversity is very important as it explains many things about the structure of mental disease. If one can symbolize the subject by this fundamental cut, in the same way one can show that a cut on a torus corresponds to the neurotic subject, and on a cross-cut surface to another sort of mental disease. (Lacan 1970, 192- Analogous topological structures arise in quantum gravity, but inasmuch as the manifolds involved are multidimensional rather than twodimensional, higher homology groups play a role as well. These multidimensional manifolds are no longer amenable to visualization in conventional three-dimensional Cartesian space: for example, the projective space RP3, which arises from the ordinary 3-sphere by identification of antipodes, would require a Euclidean embedding space of dimension In string theory, the quantum-mechanical amplitude for the interaction of n closed or open strings is represented by a functional integral (basically, a sum) over fields living on a two-dimensional manifold with boundary (Green et al. 1987) . In quantum gravity, we may expect that a similar representation will hold, except that the two-dimensional manTransgressing the Boundaries ifold with boundary will be replaced by a multidimensional one. Unfortunately, multidimensionality goes against the grain of conventional linear mathematical thought, and despite a recent broadening of attitudes (notably associated with the study of multidimensional nonlinear phenomena in chaos theory), the theory of multidimensional manifolds with boundary remains somewhat underdeveloped. Nevertheless, physicists' work on the functional-integral approach to quantum gravity continues apace (Hamber 1992 However, these criteria, admirable as they are, are insufficient for a liberatory postmodern science: they liberate human beings from the tyranny of "absolute truth" and "objective reality," but not necessarily from the tyranny of other human beings. In Andrew Ross's words, we need a science "that will be publicly answerable and of some service to progressive interests" (1991, 29).41 From a feminist standpoint, Kelly Oliver (1989, 146) makes a similar argument:
In order to be revolutionary, feminist theory cannot claim to describe what exists, or, "natural facts." Rather, feminist theories should be political tools, strategies for overcoming oppression in specific concrete situations. The goal, then, of feminist theory, should be to develop strategic theories-not true theories, not false theories, but strategic theories.
How, then, is this to be done?
In what follows, I would like to discuss the outlines of a liberatory postmodern science on two levels: first, with regard to general themes and attitudes; and second, with regard to political goals and strategies.
One characteristic of the emerging postmodern science is its stress on nonlinearity and discontinuity: this is evident, for example, in chaos theory and the theory of phase transitions as well as in quantum gravity.42 At the same time, feminist thinkers have pointed out the need for an adequate analysis of fluidity, in particular turbulent fluidity (Irigaray 1985; Hayles 1992 ).43 These two themes are not as contradictory as it might at first appear: turbulence connects with strong nonlinearity, and smoothness/fluidity is sometimes associated with discontinuity (e.g., in catastrophe theory [Thom 1975 [Thom , 1990 observer and observed, Subject and Object. Already quantum mechanics, earlier in this century, shattered the ingenuous Newtonian faith in an objective, prelinguistic world of material objects "out there"; no longer could we ask, as Heisenberg put it, whether "particles exist in space and time objectively." But Heisenberg's formulation still presupposes the objective existence of space and time as the neutral, unproblematic arena in which quantized particle-waves interact (albeit indeterministically); and it is precisely this would-be arena that quantum gravity problematizes. Just as quantum mechanics informs us that the position and momentum of a particle are brought into being only by the act of observation, so quantum gravity informs us that space and time themselves are contextual, their meaning defined only relative to the mode of observation.44
Third, the postmodern sciences overthrow the static ontological categories and hierarchies characteristic of modernist science. In place of atomism and reductionism, the new sciences stress the dynamic web of relationships between the whole and the part; in place of fixed individual essences (e.g., Newtonian particles), they conceptualize interactions and flows (e.g., quantum fields). Intriguingly, these homologous features arise in numerous seemingly disparate areas of science, from quantum gravity to chaos theory to the biophysics of self-organizing systems. In this way, the postmodern sciences appear to be converging on a new epistemological paradigm, one that may be termed an ecological perspective, broadly understood as "recogniz A fourth aspect of postmodern science is its self-conscious stress on symbolism and representation. As Robert Markley (1992, 264) points out, the postmodern sciences are increasingly transgressing disciplinary boundaries, taking on characteristics that had heretofore been the province of the humanities: Quantum physics, hadron bootstrap theory, complex number theory, and chaos theory share the basic assumption that reality cannot be described in linear terms, that nonlinear-and unsolvable-equations are the only means possible to describe a complex, chaotic, and non-deterministic reality. These postmodern theories are-significantly-all metacritical in the sense that they foreground themselves as metaphors rather than as "accurate" descriptions of reality. In terms that are more familiar to literary theorists than to theoretical physicists, we might say that these attempts by scientists to develop new strategies of description represent notes towards a theory of theories, of how representation-mathematical, experimental, and verbal-is inherently complex and problematizing, not a solution but part of the semiotics of investigating the universe.46
From a different starting point, Aronowitz (1988b, 344) likewise suggests that a liberatory science may arise from interdisciplinary sharing of epistemologies: Natural objects are also socially constructed. It is not a question of whether these natural objects, or, to be more precise, the objects of natural scientific knowledge, exist independently of the act of knowing. This question is answered by the assumption of "real" time as opposed to the presupposition, common among neo-Kantians, that time always has a referent, that temporality is therefore a relative, not an unconditioned, category. Surely, the earth evolved long before life on earth. The question is whether objects of natural scientific knowledge are constituted outside the social field. If this is possible, we can assume that science or art may develop procedures that effectively neutralize the effects emanating from the means by which we produce knowledge/art. Performance art may be such an attempt.
Finally, postmodern science provides a powerful refutation of the authoritarianism and elitism inherent in traditional science, as well as an empirical basis for a democratic approach to scientific work. For, as Bohr noted, "a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view which defy a unique description"; this is quite simply a fact about the world, much as the self-proclaimed empiricists of modernist science might prefer to deny it. In such a situation, how can a self-perpetuating secular priesthood of credentialed "scientists" purport to maintain a monopoly on the production of scientific knowledge? (Let me emphasize that I am in no way opposed to specialized scientific training; I object only when an elite caste seeks to impose its canon of "high science," with the aim of excluding a priori alternative forms of scientific production by nonmembers.)47
The content and methodology of postmodern science thus provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project, understood in its broadest sense: the transgressing of boundaries, the breaking down of barriers, the radical democratization of all aspects of social, economic, political, and cultural life (see, for example, Aronowitz 1994). Conversely, one part of this project must involve the construction of a new and truly progressive science that can serve the needs of such a democratized society-to-be. As Markley observes, there seem to be two more-or-less mutually exclusive choices available to the progressive community:
On the one hand, politically progressive scientists can try to recuperate existing practices for moral values they uphold, arguing that their right-wing enemies are defacing nature and that they, the counter-movement, have access to the truth.
[But] the state of the biosphere-air pollution, water pollution, disappearing rain forests, thousands of species on the verge of extinction, large areas of land burdened far beyond their carrying capacity, nuclear It goes without saying that postmodernist science unequivocally favors the latter, deeper approach. In addition to redefining the content of science, it is imperative to restructure and redefine the institutional loci in which scientific labor takes place-universities, government labs, and corporations-and reframe the reward system that pushes scientists to become, often against their own better instincts, the hired guns of capitalists and the military. As Aronowitz (1988b, 351) has noted, "One-third of the 11,000 physics graduate students in the United States are in the single subfield of solid state physics, and all of them will be able to get jobs in that subfield." (Although this observation appeared in 1988, it is all the more true today.) By contrast, there are few jobs available in either quantum gravity or environmental physics.
But all this is only a first step: the fundamental goal of any emancipatory movement must be to demystify and democratize the production of scientific knowledge, to break down the artificial barriers that separate "scientists" from "the public. 4. Aronowitz (1981, 28) has noted that wave-particle duality renders the "will to totality in modern science" severely problematic:
The differences within physics between wave and particle theories of matter, the indeterminacy principle discovered by Heisenberg, Einstein's relativity theory, all are accommodations to the impossibility of arriving at a unified field theory, one in which the "anomaly" of difference for a theory which posits identity may be resolved without challenging the presuppositions of science itself. I may perhaps here remind you of the extent to which in certain societies the roles of men and women are reversed, not only regarding domestic and social duties but also regarding behaviour and mentality. Even if many of us, in such a situation, might perhaps at first shrink from admitting the possibility that it is entirely a caprice of fate that the people concerned have their specific culture and not ours, and we not theirs instead of our own, it is clear that even the slightest suspicion in this respect implies a betrayal of the national complacency inherent in any human culture resting in itself.
6. This impressive work also explains the intimate connections with Gidel's proof of the incompleteness of formal systems and with Skolem's construction of nonstandard models of arithmetic, as well as with Bataille's general economy. For further discussion of Bataille's physics see Hochroth 1995.
Numerous other examples could be adduced. For instance, Barbara Johnson (1989, 12) makes no specific reference to quantum physics; but her description of deconstruction is an eerily exact summary of the complementarity principle: Alan D. Sokal "Instead of a simple either/or structure, deconstruction attempts to elaborate a discourse that says neither 'either/or, nor 'both/and' nor even 'neither/nor' while at the same time not totally abandoning these logics either." See also McCarthy 1992 for a thought-provoking analysis that raises disturbing questions about the "complicity" between (nonrelativistic) quantum physics and deconstruction.
7. Permit me in this regard a personal recollection: Fifteen years ago, when I was a graduate student, my research in relativistic quantum field theory led me to an approach that I called "de[con]structive quantum field theory" (Sokal 1982 ). Of course, at that time I was completely ignorant of Jacques Derrida's work on deconstruction in philosophy and literary theory. In retrospect, however, there is a striking affinity: my work can be read as an exploration of how the orthodox discourse (e.g., Itzykson and Zuber 1980) on scalar quantum field theory in four-dimensional space-time (in technical terms, "renormalized perturbation theory" for the p44 theory) can be seen to assert its own unreliability and thereby to undermine its own affirmations. Since then, my work has shifted to other questions, mostly connected with phase transitions; but subtle homologies between the two fields can be discerned, notably the theme of discontinuity (see n. 42). 
Aronowitz (1988b, 331) has made a provocative observation concerning nonlinear causality in quantum mechanics and its relation to the social construction of time:
Linear causality assumes that the relation of cause and effect can be expressed as a function of temporal succession. Owing to recent developments in quantum mechanics, we can postulate that it is possible to know the effects of absent causes; that is, speaking metaphorically, effects may anticipate causes so that our perception of them may precede the physical occurrence of a "cause." The hypothesis that challenges our conventional conception of linear time and causality and that asserts the possibility of time's reversal also raises the question of the degree to which the concept of "time's arrow" is inherent in all scientific theory. If these experiments are successful, the conclusions about the way time as "clock-time" has been constituted historically will be open to question. We will have "proved" by means of experiment what has long been suspected by philosophers, literary and social critics: that time is, in part, a conventional construction, its segmentation into hours and minutes a product of the need for industrial discipline, for rational organization of social labor in the early bourgeois epoch. Mermin (1990 Mermin ( , 1993 (Plumwood 1993a, 125) ; indeed, "the only 'force' allowed within the mechanistic framework is that of kinetic energythe energy of motion by contact-all other purported forces, including action at a distance, being regarded as occult" (Mathews 1991 18. These new notions of space, time, and causality are in part foreshadowed already in special relativity. Thus, Alexander Argyros (1991, 137) has noted that "in a universe dominated by photons, gravitons, and neutrinos, that is, in the very early universe, the theory of special relativity suggests that any distinction between before and after is impossible. For a particle traveling at the speed of light, or one traversing a distance that is in the order of the Planck length, all events are simultaneous." However, I cannot agree with Argyros's conclusion that Derridean deconstruction is therefore inapplicable to the hermeneutics of early-universe cosmology: Argyros's argument to this effect is based on an impermissibly totalizing use of special relativity (in technical terms, "light-cone coordinates") in a context where general relativity is inescapable. (For a similar but less innocent error, see n. 20.)
The theoretical analyses of Greenberger et al. (1989, 1990) and
Jean-Francois Lyotard (1989, 5-6) has also pointed out that not only general relativity, but also modern elementary-particle physics, imposes new notions of time:
In contemporary physics and astrophysics ... a particle has a sort of elementary memory and consequently a temporal filter. This is why contemporary physicists tend to think that time emanates from matter itself, and that it is not an entity outside or inside the universe whose function it would be to gather all different times into universal history. It is only in certain regions that such-only partial-syntheses could be detected. There would on this view be areas of determinism where complexity is increasing. 24. For another example of the "turf" effect, see Chomsky 1979 (6-7). 25. To be fair to the high-energy-physics establishment, I should mention that there is also an honest intellectual reason for their opposition to this theory: inasmuch as it posits a subquantum interaction linking patterns throughout the universe, it is, in physicists' terminology, a "nonlocal field theory." Now, the history of classical theoretical physics since the early 1800s, from Maxwell's electrodynamics to Einstein's general relativity, can be read in a very deep sense as a trend away from action-at-a-distance theories and toward local field theories: in technical terms, theories expressible by partial differential equations (Einstein and Infeld 1961; Hayles 1984). So a nonlocal field theory definitely goes against the grain. On the other hand, as Bell (1987) and others have convincingly argued, the key property of quantum mechanics is precisely its non-locality, as expressed in Bell's theorem and its generalizations (see nn. 8 and 9). Therefore, a nonlocal field theory, although jarring to physicists' classical intuition, is not only natural but in fact preferred (and possibly even mandatory?) in the quantum context. This is why classical general relativity is a local field theory, while quantum gravity (whether string, weave, or morphogenetic field) is inherently nonlocal.
26. Differential topology is the branch of mathematics concerned with those properties of surfaces (and higher-dimensional manifolds) that are unaffected by smooth deformations. The properties it studies are therefore primarily qualitative rather than quantitative, and its methods are holistic rather than Cartesian. 37. In the history of mathematics there has been a long-standing dialectic between the development of its "pure" and "applied" branches (Struik 1987) . Of course, the "applications" traditionally privileged in this context have been those profitable to capitalists or useful to their military forces: for example, number theory has been developed largely for its applications in cryptography (Loxton 1990 ). See also Hardy 1967 (120-21, 131-32 However, Pickering does not reach back far enough into the history of physics to find the basis of the research tradition from which the quark explanation emanates. It may not be found inside the tradition but in the ideology of science, in the differences behind field versus particle theories, simple versus complex explanations, the bias toward certainty rather than indeterminateness.
Alan D. Sokal
Along very similar lines, Markley (1992, 269) observes that physicists' preference for quantum chromodynamics over Chew's bootstrap theory of "subatomic democracy" (Chew 1977) is a result of ideology rather than data:
It is not surprising, in this regard, that bootstrap theory has fallen into relative disfavor among physicists seeking a GUT (Grand Unified Theory) or TOE (Theory of Everything) to explain the structure of the universe. Comprehensive theories that explain "everything" are products of the privileging of coherence and order in western science. The choice between bootstrap theory and theories of everything that confronts physicists does not have to do primarily with the truth-value offered by these accounts of available data but with the narrative structures-indeterminate or deterministic-into which these data are placed and by which they are interpreted. 47. At this point, the traditional scientist's response is that work not conforming to the evidentiary standards of conventional science is fundamentally irrational, that is, logically flawed and therefore not worthy of credence. But this refutation is insufficient: for, as Porush (1993) has lucidly observed, modern mathematics and physics have themselves admitted a powerful "intrusion of the irrational" in quantum mechanics and Gidel's theorem-although, understandably, like the Pythagoreans twenty-four centuries ago, modernist scientists have attempted to exorcise this unwanted irrational element as best they could. Porush makes a powerful plea for a "post-rational epistemology" that would retain the best of conventional Western science while validating alternative ways of knowing.
Note also that Jacques Lacan, from a quite different starting point, came long ago to a similar appreciation of the inevitable role of irrationality in modern mathematics:
If you'll permit me to use one of those formulas which come to me as I write my notes, human life could be defined as a calculus in which zero was irrational. This formula is just an image, a mathematical metaphor. When I say "irrational," I'm referring not to some unfathomable emotional state but precisely to what is called an imaginary number. The square root of minus one doesn't correspond to anything that is subject to our intuition, anything real-in the mathematical sense of the term-and yet, it must be conserved, along with its full function. (Lacan 1977, 28- The first difference between science and philosophy is their respective attitudes toward chaos. Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance. (117-18) But science, unlike philosophy, cannot cope with infinite speeds:
It is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought able to penetrate it [sic] with propositions, is actualized. A function is a Slowmotion. Of course, science constantly advances accelerations, not only in catalysis but in particle accelerators and expansions that move galaxies apart. However, the primordial slowing down is not for these phenomena a zeroinstant with which they break but rather a condition coextensive with their whole development. To slow down is to set a limit in chaos to which all speeds are subject, so that they form a variable determined as abscissa, at the same time as the limit forms a universal constant that cannot be gone beyond (for example, a maximum degree of contraction). Thefirst functives The decay of the families of men who occupied conspicuous positions in past times has been a subject of frequent research, and has given rise to various conjectures . . . The instances are very numerous in which surnames that were once common have since become scarce or have wholly disappeared. The tendency is universal, and, in explanation of it, the conclusion has hastily been drawn that a rise in physical comfort and intellectual capacity is necessarily accompanied by a diminution in 'fertility'. . . Let P0, Pl, P2, ... be the respective probabilities that a man has 0, 1, 2, ... sons, let each son have the same probability of sons of his own, and so on. What is the probability that the male line is extinct after r generations, and more generally what is the probability for any given number of descendants in the male line in any given generation?
One cannot fail to be charmed by the quaint implication that human males reproduce asexually; nevertheless, the classism, social-Darwinism, and sexism in this passage are obvious.
The second example is Laurent Schwartz's 1973 book Radon Measures. While technically quite interesting, this work is imbued, as its title makes plain, with the pro-nuclear-energy worldview that has been characteristic of French science since the early 1960s. Sadly, the French left-especially but by no means solely the PCF-has traditionally been as enthusiastic for nuclear energy as the right (see Touraine et al. 1980) . 54. Just as liberal feminists are frequently content with a minimal agenda of Alan D. Sokal legal and social equality for women and "pro-choice," so liberal (and even some socialist) mathematicians are often content to work within the hegemonic Zermelo-Fraenkel framework (which, reflecting its nineteenth-century liberal origins, already incorporates the axiom of equality) supplemented only by the axiom of choice. But this framework is grossly insufficient for a liberatory mathematics, as was proven long ago by Cohen 1966. 55. Fuzzy systems theory has been heavily developed by transnational corporations-first in Japan and later elsewhere-to solve practical problems of efficiency in labor-displacing automation.
